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The Progeny of Lee v. Weisman: Can Student-Invited 
Prayer at Public School Graduations Still be 
Constitutional? 
Thomas A. Schweitzer* 
I. INTRODUCfiON 
Over thirty years ago, the United States Supreme Court ended the 
American practice1 of reciting prayers in public schools, holding that this 
violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 2 Just three 
years ago in Lee v. Weisman3 the Court held that a prayer led by a rabbi 
who was invited by public school authorities to pray at a public school's 
graduation was also unconstitutional. 
After Lee, numerous observers concluded that the Court had 
outlawed any form of prayer at public school graduations. 4 Neverthe-
less, several courts have allowed prayer to survive a constitutional 
challenge under certain situations. Prayers in public school graduations 
have been found constitutional if they are: (1) requested by the graduating 
students rather than by school authorities, and (2) if they are delivered by 
students. 5 
* Copyright C!1> 1995 by Thomas A. Schweitzer. Associate Professor of Law, Jacob D. 
Fuchsberg Law Center, Touro College. M.A. 1968, University of Wisconsin; Ph.D. 1971, 
University of Wisconsin; J.D. 1977, Yale Law School. 
1. While our system of free public schools originated in the mid-19th century, the 
tradition of prayer in schools dates back to the 17th century. 
2. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. 
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); see U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... "). 
3. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992); see Dina F. El-Sayed, What Is the Coun 
Trying to Establish?: An Analysis ofLeev. Weisman, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 441 (1994); 
Marilyn Perrin, Leev. Weisman: Unanswered Prayers, 21 PEPP. L. REv. 207 (1994); Thomas 
A. Schweitzer, Lee v. Weisman; Whither the Establishment Clause and the Lemon v. 
Kurtzman Three-Pronged Test?, 9 TOURO L. REv. 401 (1993). 
4. See Gearon v. Loudoun County Sch. Bd., 844 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Va. 1993); 
Christina E. Martin, Student-Initiated Religious Expression after Mergens and Weisman, 61 
U. CHI. L. REv. 1565 (1994); Henry J. Reske, Graduation Prayers, Part II, A.B.A. J., July 
1993, at 14, 16. 
5. Jones v. Clear Creek lndep. Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991) vacated and 
remanded for reconsideration in lightojLee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 3020 (1992), on remand, 
977 F.2d 963, (5th Cir. 1992), cen. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993); Ingebretsen v. Jackson 
Pub. Sch. Dist., 864 F. Supp. 1473, 1479, 1488 (S.D. Miss. 1994) (supporting a broad statute 
291 
292 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 9 
This article will first discuss the Lee v. Weisman holding. Second, 
it will examine the holdings of courts that have ruled on school prayer 
cases arising after Lee. Finally, this article will analyze whether the 
"student-initiated exception" to Lee is consistent with the First Amend-
ment. 
II. LEE V. WEISMAN 
As proponents of the exception for student-initiated graduation 
prayers have pointed out, the Supreme Court in Lee v. Weisman did not 
proscribe public school graduation prayers per se. 6 Rather, the Court 
narrowly tailored its decision to the facts of the case and emphasized the 
pervasive government involvement in planning and preparing for 
graduation prayers. Thus, given what appears to be a narrow ruling, it 
is not impossible to argue that graduation prayers in different circum-
stances may still be constitutional. 
The 1992 Lee decision originated when Daniel Weisman, a Jew, was 
offended during the middle school graduation of his daughter because the 
Baptist minister that gave the invocation and benediction asked the 
audience to stand for a moment of silence to give thanks to Jesus Christ. 
Three years later, when Mr. Weisman's younger daughter Deborah was 
to graduate from the same school, he asked the middle school's principal 
to eliminate the graduation prayers. 7 The principal refused to conduct 
the ceremony without prayer but attempted to placate Weisman by asking 
a rabbi to deliver the invocation and benediction at that year's gradua-
tion. 8 Pursuant to school district policy, the invited rabbi was given a 
set of "Guidelines for Civic Occasions" concerning public prayers at 
permitting "nonproselytizing student-initiated voluntary prayer" during a variety of "school-
related student events" enjoined except for high school graduation or commencement 
ceremonies following Jones); Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 851 F. Supp. 446 (M.D. Fla. 
1994); Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 821 F. Supp. 638 (D. Idaho 1993), aff'dinpartand 
denied in part, 41 F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Harris, 41 F.3d at 459 (Wright, J., 
dissenting in pertinent part). 
Other courts appear to believe that Lee contains no exception even for prayers at public 
school graduations requested, written, and delivered by students. Harris, 41 F.3d 447; ACLU 
of New Jersey v. Black Horse Pike Regional Bd. of Educ., Civ. No. 93-5368 (3d Cir. filed 
Jun. 25, 1993); Gearon, 844 F. Supp. at 1097. 
6. As one court noted, "The Court had the opportunity in Lee to ban all prayer at 
graduation ceremonies. Rather than focus upon and, indeed, emphasize the need for fact 
sensitivity, the Court could have stated that any prayer at public high school graduation 
ceremonies violates the Constitution under any circumstances. It did not do so. Or, the Court 
could have required that separate baccalaureate services be held in lieu of including invocations 
and/or benedictions in official graduation ceremonies. Again, the Court declined to so hold." 
Adler, 851 F. Supp. at 456. 
7. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2652. 
8. /d. 
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nonsectarian civic ceremonies and was advised that his invocation and 
benediction should be nonsectarian. 9 
Despite these steps taken by the school district to have a nonsectarian 
prayer, the Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts and 
struck down the school's graduation prayers. Justice Kennedy, writing 
for the 5-4 majority, argued that "[t]he government involvement with 
religious activity in this case is pervasive, to the point of creating a state-
sponsored and state-directed religious exercise in a public school. "10 
Thus characterized, the prayers plainly conflicted with basic First 
Amendment principles of separation of church and state. 11 
III. JONES V. CLEAR CREEK INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT 
The facts of Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School Distrid2 
were quite different from those in Lee. In Jones, high school senior 
Pamela Jones and other graduating seniors sued to enjoin invocations and 
9. Id.; see Thomas A. Schweitzer, Lee v. Weisman and the Establishment Clause: Are 
Invocations and Benedictions at Public School Graduations Constitutionally Unspeakable?, 69 
U. DEr. MERCY L. REV., 113, 119-21 (1992). 
10. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2655. Justice Kennedy also concluded that "the principal directed 
and controlled the content of the prayer," id. at 2656, and that the students attending the 
graduation ceremony were subject to subtle "coercive pressure" from both the public and their 
peers to participate in the rabbi's prayers, id. at 2658. But to state that the school principal 
"controlled the content" of the rabbi's prayers is a considerable exaggeration as the rabbi never 
submitted the prayer texts to the principal or anyone else fore review before praying. See id. 
at 2658. 
There is also considerable question regarding the degree of "coercion" that existed for the 
students to "participate" in the rabbi's prayers. Justice Kennedy conceded that the significance 
of the act of standing for prayer is ambiguous; he acknowledged this can represent adherence 
to a view or simple respect for the views of others. Id. 
Justice Scalia caustically attacked the majority's "boundless, and boundlessly manipulable, 
test of psychological coercion." Id. at 2679 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Others have similarly 
questioned the validity of the Court's social science conclusions. See, e.g., Donald N. Bersoff, 
Autonomy for Vulnerable Populations: The Supreme Court's Reckless Disregard for Self-
Determination and Social Science, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1569, 1603-04 (1992) (agreeing with 
Justice Scalia and criticizing the Supreme Court's selective use of psychological research in its 
"coercion" analysis in Lee); Scott V. Carroll, Note, Lee v. Weisman: Amateur Psychology or 
an Accurate Representation of Adolescent Development; How Should Courts Evaluate 
Psychological Evidence?, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 513 (1994). 
11. See, e.g., Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 591 
(1989); Wallacev. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,425 (1962) ("It 
is not part of the business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the 
American people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by government."); 
Everson v. Board ofEduc. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947); see also West Virginia State 
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("If there is any fixed star in our 
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be 
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to 
confess by word or act their faith therein."). 
12. Jones v. Clear Creek lndep. Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991). 
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benedictions which contained overt Christian references. 13 These 
prayers had traditionally been included in their high school's graduation 
ceremonies. 14 
Three weeks before the trial was to commence, however, the school 
district's Board of Trustees adopted a resolution specifying that the 
decision whether to include the prayers in the graduation ceremonies was 
up to the students and that, in any event, the prayers were to be 
"nonsectarian and nonproselytizing in nature. " 15 Applying the familiar 
three-pronged Establishment Clause test from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 16 the 
Fifth Circuit concluded that the resolution satisfied all three prongs: (1) 
The Board's resolution was said to have had the "secular purpose" of 
"solemnizing"17 the graduation occasion; (2) its primary effect was not 
to advance religion (because the graduating students affected were almost 
13. ld. at 417. 
14. [d. 
15. The resolution was drafted by the district's counsel to conform with Judge Merritt's 
opinion in Stein v. Plainwell Community Schs., 822 F.2d 1406, 1409 (6th Cir. 1987). The 
resolution provided: 
I. The use of an invocation and/or benediction at high school graduation 
exercise shall rest within the discretion of the graduating senior class, with 
the advice and counsel of the senior class principal; 
2. The invocation and benediction, if used, shall be given by a student 
volunteer; and 
3. Consistent with the principle of equal liberty of conscience, the invocation 
and benediction shall be nonsectarian and nonproselytizing in nature. 
Jones, 930 F.2d at 417. 
16. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). While Justices Ginsberg and Breyer have not yet expressed 
opinions discussing the Lemon test, at least five of the other Supreme Court Justices have 
expressed either outright opposition to the test, see, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 
636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("pessimistic evaluation" of Lemon); Lamb's Chapel v. 
Center Moriches Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2150 (1993) (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgment); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 112 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (Lemon test is "a constitutional theory [that] has no basis in the history of the 
amendment it seeks to interpret, is difficult to apply and yields unprincipled results."); County 
of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 656 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("Substantial revision of our 
Establishment Clause doctrine may be in order."), or argued that it needs revision, see, e.g., 
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 429 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (voicing "doubts about 
the entanglement test"). In Lee, Justice Kennedy advanced his agenda by ignoring Lemon and 
relying instead on the "coercion test" which he wants the Court to adopt. Lee v. Weisman, 
112 S. Ct. 2649, 2655 (1992). 
For a look at a recent case construing modern Establishment jurisprudence in another 
context, see generally ScottS. Thomas, Note, Beyond a Sour Lemon: A Look at Grumet v. 
Board of Education of the Kiryas Joel Village School District, 8 B. Y.U. J. PuB. L. 531 (1994). 
17. Justice O'Connor first suggested the justification of religious public ceremonies in 
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984): "[G]overnmentacknowledgments of religion serve, 
in the only ways reasonably possible in our culture, the legitimate secular purpose ... of 
solemnizing public occasions." ld. at 693 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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adults and were consequently mature and not impressionable concerning 
any religious influences of the prayers); and (3) the fact that the prayers 
were written and presented by student volunteers eliminated the risk of 
excessive entanglement, notwithstanding the fact that once a year the 
senior class principal was called upon to "pre-screen" the proposed 
invocations for sectarianism and proselytization.18 
Surprisingly, after the Supreme Court vacated and remanded Jones 
for reconsideration in light of its decision in Lee, the Fifth Circuit again 
reached its initial holding. Following that holding, the Supreme Court 
denied plaintiffs' petition for certiorari. 19 The Fifth Circuit panel again 
concluded that the graduation prayers did not violate any of the three 
prongs of the Lemon test, but went on to scrutinize the prayers under the 
"endorsement test"20 and the Lee "coercion test." The court concluded 
that "endorsement" of religion was absent since the resolution did not 
mandate an invocation but merely permitted one if the students so 
chose. 21 In addition, the Fifth Circuit found that the "coercion" which 
required the proscription of the prayers in Lee was absent in Jones since 
the resolution expressly required that the state government not decide 
whether prayers would occur, leaving that decision to the graduating 
students. The resolution also precluded anyone but a student volunteer 
not chosen by government officials from offering the prayers, thereby 
ensuring a different person each year and avoiding use of the same 
clergyman. Finally, the resolution only specified that the prayers be 
"nonsectarian and non-proselytizing," unlike the detailed guidelines 
provided to the rabbi by the principal. 22 
18. Jones, 930 F.2d at 419-23. 
19. Jones v. Clear Creek lndep. Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993). 
20. Justice O'Connor proposed the "endorsement" test for Establishment Clause 
violations in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985): 
The Establishment Clause is infringed when the government makes adherence to 
religion relevant to a person's standing in the political community. Direct 
governmental action endorsing religion or a particular religious practice is invalid 
under this approach because it sends a message to nonadherents that they are 
outsiders, not full members ofthe political community, and an accompanying message 
to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community. 
ld. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
21. See Jones, 977 F.2d at 968-69. 
22. ld. at 969-71. The court further concluded that there was less danger of 
impermissible psychological pressure to participate in the prayers in Jones than in Lee: 
We think that the graduation prayers permitted by the Resolution place less 
psychological pressure on students than the prayers at issue in Lee because all 
students, after having participated in the decision of whether prayers will be given, 
are aware that any prayers represent the will of their peers, who are less able to 
coerce participation than an authority figure from the state or clergy. 
ld. at 971. 
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IV. llARR.IS V. JOJNI SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 241 
The central issue in Jones-whether an Establishment Clause 
violation can be avoided when students vote to have graduation prayers 
and deliver the prayers themselves-reappeared again in an appellate 
court decision. 23 While the Idaho federal district court in Harris v. 
Joint School District No. 241 relied on Jones, 24 the Ninth Circuit 
rejected its approach and struck down the graduation prayers at issue. 25 
High school graduation programs in Idaho School District 241 had 
sometimes included invocations and benedictions, and the Grangeville 
High School senior class voted to have a student give an invocation and 
benediction at its graduation. 26 Phyllis Harris, the mother of three 
children who attended school in the district, sued in 1991 to enjoin this 
practice. 27 
In this case the school district superintendent had instructed all 
principals in the district to let graduating seniors vote whether they 
wanted prayers at their graduation ceremonies. 28 The superintendent's 
23. Harrisv. JointSch. Dist. No. 241,821 F. Supp. 638 (D. Idaho 1993), aff'dinpan 
and denied in pan, 41 F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1994). 
24. Harris, 821 F. Supp. at 638. 
25. Harris, 41 F.3d at 447. 
26. Harris, 821 F. Supp. at 641. 
27. Robert L. Phillips, The Constitutionality of High School Graduation Prayers under 
Harris v. School District No. 241, 8 B.Y.U. J. PuB. L. 491, 504-05 (1994). The district court 
denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and deferred ruling on motions for 
summary judgment by the plaintiffs and intervenor by the defendants pending the Supreme 
Court's decision in Lee. Harris, 821 F. Supp. at 638. Harris was subsequently "administra-
tively terminated" and was reopened with further discovery and briefs by the parties after the 
Supreme Court's June 24, 1992 decision. Jd. 
28. The superintendent sent the following memorandum to the principals of District 241: 
I just want to make sure we are all doing the same thing for Invocation and 
Benediction at graduation. The school board is permitting Invocation and Benediction 
at graduation and not requiring Invocation and Benediction at graduation. These are 
the guidelines I want you to follow: 
I. Let the senior students vote on whether they do or don't want Invocation and 
Benediction at graduation. 
2. If the answer is yes, then they should vote on whether they want a minister 
or a student to say the Invocation and Benediction. 
3. If the students vote for a minister, then the students should vote on which 
minister they want to say the Invocation and Benediction. 
4. If the students vote for students to say the Invocation and Benediction, you 
may want to have the 3rd and 4th students in GPA do this. Make everything an 
option and let the students vote. We will dictate nothing to the students. If a 
student does not want to go to graduation, I would not force the issue. Give 
him/her the diploma after the graduation exercise. 
Harris, 821 F. Supp. at 641-42 n.7. The school district informed the court that the super-
intendent's memorandum did not change prior practice but merely reaffirmed the school 
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guidelines put this choice entirely up to the students.29 While it had 
earlier deferred ruling on the pending motions for summary judgment 
pending the Supreme Court decision, the court emphasized that the 
Supreme Court's ruling was heavily fact-dependent and did little to 
resolve the issues in Harris. 30 
However, the court concluded that "the Supreme Court is willing to 
tolerate some prayer at graduation ceremonies "31 because it had passed 
up two opportunities to impose a blanket ban on such prayers. 32 The 
key fact in Harris, unlike Jones, was that the senior graduating students 
themselves, rather than faculty or administrators, determined every 
element of the graduation and "the record demonstrat[ed] that faculty and 
administrators [had] little or no involvement in that process. "33 
Accordingly, the court concluded that "the practice of allowing students 
to determine whether or not to include prayer in their graduation 
ceremonies does not violate the Establishment Clause. "34 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit totally rejected the reasoning of the 
district court and of Jones, on which the district court had relied. 35 In 
district's neutrality on the issue. The only change in the district's practice from that of the 
preceding fifteen years was to supply students with written ballots and to insert in the 
graduation programs a disclaimer stating that School District 241 "neither promotes nor 
endorses any statements made by any person involved in the graduation ceremony," and that 
any statements made during the graduation ceremony "should not be considered the opinions 
or beliefs of the District, the Board of Trustees or the Superintendent." ld. at 642. 
29. In 1993, the seniors at Clearwater Valley High, also in the district, voted for a 
moment of silence at graduation without any prayer. ld. at 641 n.6; Harris, 41 F.3d at 453. 
At Grangeville High, no school official reviewed the prayers prior to commencement, and, at 
the graduation ceremony, no one was asked to participate in the prayer by standing, bowing 
their heads, or removing their hats. ld. at 453. In addition, the following disclaimer had 
appeared since 1991 in the Grangeville High commencement programs: 
The Board of Trustees of Joint School District No. 241 neither promotes nor endorses 
any statements made by any person involved in the graduation ceremony. The 
District endorses each person's free exercise of speech and religion and any comments 
or statements made during the graduation ceremony should not be considered the 
opinions or beliefs of the District, the Board of Trustees or the Superintendent. 
Harris, 821 F. Supp. at 642. 
30. Harris, 821 F. Supp. at 640. 
31. ld. at 643. 
32. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992); Jones v. Clear Creek lndep. Sch. 
Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992). 
33. Harris, 821 F. Supp. at 643. Student control of the entire process was a reality: 
While Principal Leuck recommended that Class President Mike Heath write down the prayer 
and give her a copy of it, he did neither but was still permitted to give the invocation and 
benediction. Phillips, supra note 27, at 504-05. 
34. Harris, 821 F. Supp. at 643-44. Although the court indicated it was not bound to 
follow Jones, much of the reasoning in Jones was "persuasive." ld. at 643. 
35. "As implied by this discussion, we find the reasoning of Jones and cases following 
it flawed." Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447, 457 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Adler 
v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 851 F. Supp. 446 (M.D. Fla. 1994)). 
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the court of appeal's view, Lee and the Ninth Circuit's earlier decision 
in Collins v. Chandler Unified School Districf6 required the conclusion 
that the student-initiated graduation prayers were unconstitutional. 
Ignoring differences such as the fact that graduating seniors and not 
members of the clergy delivered the prayers at Grangeville High School, 
and that the praying students were requested to do so by their classmates 
and not by the high school principal, the court asserted that "Grangeville 
High's graduation is in many if not most respects like the graduation at 
issue in Lee. "37 The Ninth Circuit in Collins had held unconstitutional 
a public high school principal's permission to the Student Council to 
begin assemblies during the school day with a prayer by a student; the 
court assumed without discussion that Collins controlled the much 
different graduation ceremony context. 38 
The core of the Lee decision was the following: 
These dominant facts mark and control the confines of our 
decision: [1] State officials direct the performance of a formal religious 
exercise at . . . graduation ceremonies for secondary schools. [2] 
Even for those students who object to the religious exercise, their 
attendance and participation in the state-sponsored religious activity are 
in a fair and real sense obligatory, though the school district does not 
require attendance as a condition for receipt of the diploma. 39 
The Ninth Circuit began by attempting to tailor the facts of Harris 
into this pattern. This court stated that pervasive "state involvement" 
was present in the use of graduation prayers when "the school ultimately 
controls the event"40 and that "the seniors have authority to make deci-
sions regarding graduation only because the school allows them to have 
it. "41 Secondly, the school provided the building for the graduation 
ceremony and subsidized it.42 The court regarded the senior class which 
had voted for prayers as an "agent" to which the school district had 
invalidly "delegated" its authority to make decisions regarding a school-
36. Collins v. Chandler Unified Sch. Dist., 644 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1981). 
37. Harris, 41 F.3d at 452. 
38. The court's only reference to the significant factual differences between prayer as 
an everyday practice in public schools and prayer once a year at a graduation ceremony 
attended by families and friends is the simplistic observation "[t]hat school officials establish 
the time of graduation renders irrelevant the fact that graduation does not take place during 
normal school hours." /d. at 454 n.5. 
39. /d. at 451 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2655 (1992)). 
40. ld. at 454. As in Collins, the Harris court found "no meaningful distinction" 
between school officials acting directly and school officials "merely permitting students to 
direct the exercises." ld. 
41. /d. 
42. /d. 
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controlled event; giving majorities such powers would undermine the 
counter-majoritarian protections of the First Amendment and would inject 
"divisiveness" into the public schools. 43 
The court rejected the claim that the school district had made the 
Grangeville High School graduation ceremony an open forum, as the 
school district contended. Only speakers chosen by the majority of the 
senior class were allowed, and this closed the ceremony to minority 
views.44 In addition, the court implied that these graduation prayers 
were coercive, stating that "[s]tudents are as obligated to attend and 
participate in graduation prayers, either by bowing their heads or 
maintain[ing] respectful silence, at Grangeville High graduation as at the 
high school commencement discussed in Lee."45 
The court completed its analysis with a perfunctory application of the 
first two prongs of the three-pronged test from Lemon.46 The court 
agreed with the Collins decision that "the invocation of assemblies with 
43. ld. at 455. 
44. The court said these facts made other cases "inapposite," including Lamb's Chapel 
v. Center Moriches Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993), Board of Educ. of Westside 
Community Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990), and Garnett v. Renton Sch. Dist. No. 403, 
987 F.2d 641 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 72 (1993). Harris, 41 F.3d at 456. In an 
"open forum" under traditional First Amendment doctrine, the government may not limit the 
speech that occurs. /d. at 458. The court's conclusion that the graduation ceremony was not 
an open forum disposed of the argument that the students had a freedom of speech right to 
deliver the graduation prayers. In addition, since the students were free to pray outside of the 
graduation ceremony, the Court rejected defendants' argument that they had a free exercise 
right to pray at the ceremony. /d. 
45. /d. at 457 (citing Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2658 (1992)). This conclusion 
appears to contradict the defendants' claims, unrefuted by plaintiffs and quoted with evident 
agreement by the court, that "[n]o one is asked to participate in the prayer by standing, bowing 
their heads, or removing their hats" /d. at 453. 
46. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). To survive a challenge to its 
constitutionality under the Establishment Clause, a state action or enactment must have a 
secular purpose, its primary effect must be neither to advance nor inhibit religion, and it must 
not foster excessive entanglement between government and religion. /d. This widely-criticized 
test has been the established standard for Establishment Clause violations for over twenty years 
but has been criticized by at least five current or former Supreme Court Justices. See 
discussion supra note 16. Nevertheless, the test's much-anticipated demise has never come 
about, and the Supreme Court in recent cases has increasingly chosen to disregard Lemon, thus 
further confusing the rather incoherent muddle of Establishment jurisprudence. See e.g., Lee 
v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). In Lee, 
Justice Kennedy, the pivotal fifth vote who wrote the majority opinion, was clearly intent on 
promoting his "coercion" test for Establishment Clause violations, barely mentioning Lemon. 
See generally Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2649. This has further confused matters for lower court 
judges, many of whom, in order to play it safe, apply both the Lemon and coercion tests, as 
the Ninth Circuit did in Harris. Harris, 41 F.3d at 451. In Jones the Fifth Circuit applied 
both these tests as well as Justice O'Connor's "endorsement" test. Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992). 
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prayer has no apparent secular purpose"47 and rejected the school 
district's argument that the secular purpose was to "solemnize the 
occasion," as prayer was "objectively and inherently religious. "48 In 
addition, because the graduation prayers were indistinguishable from 
prayers recited in a church service, the court concluded that the primary 
effect of graduation prayers was to advance religion in violation of the 
Establishment Clause. 49 
V. 0rHER RECENT CASES 
A case involving student-sponsored prayers at a public high school 
graduation is currently pending in the Third Circuit. 50 After the 
authorities at the Highland Regional High School in New Jersey decided 
to permit a student-sponsored prayer at the graduation exercises, the 
American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey sued ten days before 
graduation seeking to enjoin all such prayers. Following a hearing on 
four days prior to the graduation, the federal district court denied 
plaintiff's application for a preliminary injunction, noting that "there was 
no evidence of encouragement or sponsorship by the defendants, and that 
in fact students at the high school were responsible for both the decision 
to have a prayer at the graduation and the selection of the student who 
would give the prayer. "51 The next day, the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals reversed this decision and preliminarily enjoined all graduation 
prayers in the school district, deeming the case essentially indistinguish-
able from Lee. 52 Justice Souter denied a stay of the Third Circuit's 
47. Harris, 41 F.3d at 458 (quoting Collins v. Chandler Unified Sch. Dist., 644 F.2d 
759, 762 (1981)). The defendant school district in Collins, of course, had not even suggested 
any secular purpose for the school prayers, so the court had no choice but to conclude as it did. 
/d. This conclusion on an uncontroverted point, however, should not be taken as a universal 
truth. 
48. /d. 
49. /d. The court did not discuss excessive entanglement. /d. 
50. ACLU of New Jersey v. Black Horse Pike Regional Bd. ofEduc., Civ. No. 93-2651 
(D.N.J. Mar. 29, 1994). 
51. /d. 
52. The court made the following observation: 
[T]he graduation ceremony is a school sponsored event; the fact that the school 
board has chosen to delegate the decision regarding one segment of the ceremony 
to the members of the graduating class does not alter that sponsorship, does not 
diminish the effect of a prayer on students who do not share the same or any 
religious perspective, and does not serve to distinguish, in any material way, the 
facts of this case from the facts of Lee v. Weisman .... 
ACLU of New Jersey v. Black Horse Pike, Civ. No. 93-5368 (3d Cir. June 25, 1993), cert. 
denied,_ U.S._, June 25, 1993, denied request for vacating injunction, Civ. No. 93-5368 
(3d Cir. June 28, 1993), permanent injunction entered on remand, Civ. No. 93-2651 (D.N.J. 
Mar. 29, 1994). 
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order on graduation day, and in early 1994 the district court, on the same 
record, permanently enjoined all graduation prayers in the school 
district. 53 
In two other recent federal district court cases, Gearon v. Loudoun 
County School Board,54 and Adler v. Duval County School Board,55 
opposite conclusions were reached regarding high school graduation 
prayer. Both cases involved the same circumstances as Jones and Harris, 
namely that, in both of the recent cases, plaintiffs challenged the 
constitutionality of school district policies which permitted students to 
request and deliver prayers at graduation ceremonies. 
Pursuant to a school board resolution in Gearon, the following ballot 
was distributed to seniors for a vote at each of the four Loudoun County, 
Virginia high schools: 
Do we, the Senior Class at [school name], wish to have a 
nonsectarian, non-proselytizing invocation/benediction/prayer or 
inspirational message presented at graduation? 
Yes, I vote in favor of the above proposition. 
No, I vote against the above proposition. 56 
The students at all four schools voted in favor of graduation prayer. The 
messages delivered by students at two of the schools were clearly 
prayers, while the other two were clearly inspirational but not theologi-
cal. 57 The court agreed with plaintiffs' argument that graduation prayers 
are per se unconstitutional. 58 However, in light of its recognition that 
no other court had so held,59 the court went on to accept plaintiffs' 
53. The district judge made it clear that he still believed that injunctive relief was not 
warranted but was constrained to bow to superior authority. Black Horse Pike, Civ. No. 93-
2651 (D.N.J. Mar. 29, 1994). An appeal of the permanent injunction was argued in the Third 
Circuit in January 1995 and was pending when this article went to press. 
54. 844 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Va. 1993). 
55. 851 F. Supp. 446 (M.D. Fla. 1994). 
56. Gearon, 844 F. Supp. at 1100. 
57. They were addressed to "Dear Heavenly Father" and "Almighty," respectively. /d. 
at 110 I. The language of the other two messages were inspirational but not theological: one 
endorsed a "spiritual" answer and the other included the admonition, "Let our faith guide us 
through these lessons of life .... " /d. at 1102. 
58. The court was persuaded that the correct view was the one represented by plaintiffs' 
primary argument, i.e., that a constitutional violation inherently occurs when, in a secondary 
school graduation setting, a prayer is offered, regardless of who makes the decision that the 
prayer will be given and who authorizes the actual wording of the remarks. ld. at 1099. The 
court went so far as to claim that "[t]o involuntarily subject a student at such an event [his/her 
graduation] to a display of religion that is offensive ... to his or her own religion or lack of 
rei igion is to constructively exclude that student from graduation, given the options the student 
has." /d. at 1100. Nor could the state simply "delegate" the decision regarding prayers at 
graduation to the graduating class, because "[t]he notion that a person's constitutional rights 
may be subject to a majority vote is itself anathema." /d. 
59. Jd. at 1100 n.4. 
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secondary position, holding that all four graduation ceremonies entailed 
excessive state entanglement of the public schools with religion in 
violation of the Lemon test: they were sponsored by the school district 
and arranged by the principals who organized the student vote and 
reviewed the students' remarks prior to the ceremony in three of the 
schools. 
The court in Adler reached the opposite result on similar facts. The 
Duval County School Superintendent initially directed school principals 
to eliminate graduation prayers after Lee was decided. However, after 
this action met with protests, the superintendent asked the board's legal 
counsel to research the issue. She later advised him that student-initiated 
and student-led prayer would be permissible as long as the administration 
and faculty did not participate in the decision. On May 5, 1993, counsel 
issued a memorandum to all county high school principals which stated: 
This area of the law is far from clear at this time, and we have 
been threatened by lawsuits from both sides on the issue depending on 
what action we take. The key to the Lee v. Wisei1Uln [sic] decision was 
that the prayer given at that graduation ceremony was directed and 
initiated by the school system, which made it unconstitutional, rather 
than by permissive student choice and initiative. With that premise in 
mind, the following guidelines may be of some assistance: 
1. The use of a brief opening and/or closing message, not to 
exceed two minutes, at high school graduation exercises shall rest 
within the discretion of the graduating senior class; 
2. The opening and/or closing message shall be given by a 
student volunteer, in the graduating senior class, chosen by the 
graduating senior class as a whole; 
3. If the graduating senior class chooses to use an opening 
and/or closing message, the content of that message shall be 
prepared by the student volunteer and shall not be monitored or 
otherwise reviewed by Duval County School Board [sic], its 
officers or employees. 
The purpose of these guidelines is to allow the students to 
direct their own graduation message without monitoring or review 
by school officials. ro 
60. Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 851 F. Supp. 446, 449 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (quoting 
the deposition of the Superintendent of Schools, Larry Zenke). At its June I meeting, the 
school board voted 4-3 against a proposal to substitute a moment of silence for any student-
initiated message at graduation; thus the May 5 memorandum became official Board policy. 
/d. 
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Pursuant to these guidelines, the graduating seniors at ten of the 
seventeen county high schools voted to include prayer in their graduation 
ceremonies. 61 
The district court analyzed the challenged policy under both the 
Lemon test and Lee, and, based on several reasons, concluded that it 
satisfied both standards. First, eschewing any effort to analyze the 
motives, intentions, and purposes of individual administrators and board 
members, the court found that the policy in the May 5 memorandum had 
the secular purpose of "retain[ing], the graduating students so desired, the 
giving of messages to solemnize the occasion and to observe and protect 
the right of free speech of the students giving such messages. "62 
Second, the court found that the policy's primary effect was not to 
advance religion because adherence to the guidelines might not result in 
any prayer: seven of the seventeen schools concerned had no prayers in 
their graduation ceremonies, and, of those schools which did have prayer, 
none was initiated by public authorities. Third, the public high school 
graduation ceremonies were designated, limited public fora as they were 
traditionally held at coliseums, not in the school buildings, and nearly the 
entire program consisted of speeches by leaders of both the students and 
the community. Because the religious speech was communicated in a 
public forum, the state neither endorsed nor approved of it. The court 
determined that the school board policy did not entail excessive 
entanglement of governmental and religious institutions; indeed, there was 
no entanglement: the students had total freedom to determine the content 
of their messages as they were not reviewed by any school official. 
Turning to the "coercion" test of Lee, the court found that the 
circumstances in Adler were quite different from those in Providence. 
The guidelines did not mandate or solicit graduation prayers; they merely 
permitted them. The high school principal did not decide to have the 
prayers or designate the prayer-giver, as in Lee. Unlike the facts in Lee, 
61. /d. Apparently the other seven schools' graduation ceremonies were limited to 
secular messages. /d. at 449-50. 
62. /d. at 453. Such a finding of secular purpose was supported by two recent cases. 
In Chabad-Lubavitch ofGeorgiav. Miller, 5 F.3d 1383 (11th Cir. 1993) (en bane), the court 
held that the State of Georgia would not violate the Establishment Clause were it to permit a 
Jewish group to erect a Chanukah menorah-a religious symbol-on the plaza in front of the 
state capitol building. Permitting the display, the court held, "would advance the secular 
purpose of providing an arena for its citizenry's exercise of the constitutional right to free 
speech," and would therefore not violate the Lerrwn test. Miller, 5 F.3d at 1389, quoted in 
Adler, 851 F. Supp. at 452-53. Similarly, the Sixth Circuit had recently declared that "[A] 
policy of treating religious speech the same as all other speech certainly serves a secular 
purpose." Americans United For Separation of Church and State v. City of Grand Rapids, 980 
F.2d 1538, 1543 (6th Cir. 1992) (en bane), quoted in Adler, 851 F. Supp. at 453. 
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only students, and not clergy, gave the prayers. In addition, their prayers 
exerted less psychological pressure on other students than the prayers in 
Lee because the students realized that the prayers represented the will of 
their peers who were less able to coerce participation than authoritative 
figures from the state or clergy. 63 The court concluded that the 
challenged school board policy did not violate the Establishment Clause 
and granted summary judgment for the defendants. 64 
VI. ANALYSIS 
The remaining question for decision by the United States Supreme 
Court in the area of prayer at public high school graduations is whether 
the Establishment Clause is violated when students request, compose, and 
deliver graduation prayers, and school districts and administrators merely 
acquiesce. Despite Justice Kennedy's verbal overkill in Lee and his 
insistence on finding state coercion where there was none, 65 the Lee 
decision was narrowly tailored to the facts. The three most important 
facts were that the high school principal decided that an invocation and 
benediction would be included in the graduation ceremony, he invited a 
rabbi to deliver them, and he provided the rabbi with guidelines and 
recommendations concerning the content of the prayers. None of these 
factors was present in Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School District, 
Harris v. Joint School District No. 241, American Civil Liberties Union 
of New Jersey v. Black Horse Pike Regional Board of Education, Gearon 
v. Loudoun County School Board, or Adler v. Duval County School 
Board. In these cases, students requested to have prayers, they composed 
them, and they delivered them at graduation. These cases are clearly 
distinguishable from Lee, and the Supreme Court could uphold the 
constitutionality of graduation prayer in these cases without diluting Lee. 
63. Adler, 851 F. Supp. at 456 (quoting Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 
F.2d 963, 97 (5th Cir. 1991)). 
64. See also Goluba v. School Dist. of Ripon, 1995 WL 8235 (7th Cir. Jan. 11, 1995); 
Brody v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108 (3d Cir. 1992); lngebretsen v. Jackson Public Sch. Dist., 864 
F. Supp. 1473 (S.D. Miss. 1994); Griffith v. Teran, 794 F. Supp. 1054 (D. Kan. 1992) 
reconsidered in light of Lee v. Weisman, 807 F. Supp. 107 (D. Kan. 1992); Society of 
Separationists, Inc. v. Taggart, 862 P.2d 1339 (Utah 1993). 
65. See Justice Kennedy's Tortured Opinion in Schweitzer, supra note 3, at 434-39. For 
example, as noted above, the school principal invited a rabbi to deliver the prayers and 
furnished him with guidelines though the rabbi was left to compose the prayers himself. Justice 
Kennedy nevertheless asserted that the principal "directed and controlled the content of [the 
rabbi's prayer]" and that school officials "monitored prayer" and attempted to "compose 
official prayers." Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2656 (1992). Similarly, although there 
was no indication that graduating students and others in the audience were asked to stand or 
to bow their heads or did either of these things when the rabbi spoke, Justice Kennedy asserted 
that school officials "compel[led students] to participate in a religious exercise." /d. at 2661. 
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The district court in Gearon favored an absolute ban on graduation 
prayers and had the candor to acknowledge that neither the Supreme 
Court in Lee nor any other court had held that an absolute prohibition 
was required by the Establishment Clause. 66 The Gearon court made 
an alternate holding that the state was excessively entangled with religion; 
the high school principals arranged to have the seniors vote on the prayer 
issue, and some of the principals reviewed the remarks before they were 
made. The first factor-principals arranging a student vote-is immateri-
al, but one can make a colorable claim that the prior review of religious 
remarks did violate the entanglement prong of the Establishment 
Clause. 67 
The Ninth Circuit opinion in Harris, on the other hand, is most 
unpersuasive. Its finding of "ultimate control" over the graduation 
ceremonies by the school-because the seniors only had the authority to 
make decisions concerning graduation where the school allowed them to 
have it-is irrelevant and disregards the record evidence that the school 
authorities in no way influenced either the decision to have prayers or the 
content of the prayers the students delivered. Equally irrelevant is the 
fact that the school provides the building in which graduation is held and 
incurs the expenses. Public funding and "ultimate control" retained by 
the school authorities are characteristic of all graduations, and to say that 
such factors are pivotal is to exclude any possibility of constitutional 
graduation prayer. 68 Rather than engaging in such spurious "analysis," 
the court would have been more candid in holding that graduation prayer 
is per se unconstitutional. In addition, it verges on senselessness to 
assimilate school assemblies to graduation ceremonies on the basis of the 
fact that the school officials set the time for both, thereby ignoring all the 
obvious differences between the classroom environment and the 
commencement ceremony. 69 
66. Gearon v. Loudoun County Sch. Bd., 844 F. Supp. 1097, 1100 (E.D. Va. 1993). 
Of course, District Judge Bryan seems to have caught the spirit of though surpassing Justice 
Kennedy's exaggeration when Judge Bryan asserted that to involuntarily subject a student at 
his graduation to a display of religion that is offensive or not agreeable to his/her religion "is 
to constructively exclude that student from graduation." /d. 
67. It should be emphasized that Gearon is the only one of the cases discussed in which 
such prior review occurred. 
68. The dissent in Harris provided the correct answer to the majority's argument: "The 
Supreme Court has clarified that custodial oversight 'does not impermissibly entangle 
government in the day-to-day surveillance or administration of religious activities."' Harris 
v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241,41 F.3d 447,460 n.2. (9th Cir. 1994) (Wright, J., dissenting in 
part) (quoting Board of Educ. of Westside Community Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 253 
(1990)). 
69. In applying Collins (concerning school assemblies) to Harris, the Ninth Circuit 
stated, "That school officials establish the time of graduation renders irrelevant the fact that 
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Similarly, the Ninth Circuit exhibits myopia in its inability to discern 
any secular purpose in having graduation prayers. Again, Judge Wright 
in dissent had an appropriate response: "The School District merely 
accommodates the students' decision. Accommodation of and incidental 
benefits to religion do not violate the Establishment Clause. Accom-
modation does not endorse religious belief over disbelief, but rather 
shows respect for the fundamental values of others. "70 By all accounts, 
some students are intensely desirous of distinguishing this landmark event 
in their lives with prayer, and there is plainly a secular purpose in 
attempting to satisfy such aspirations. 
On balance, the Idaho federal district judge in Harris, the Fifth 
Circuit in Jones v. Clear Creek, and the Florida federal district judge in 
Adler v. Duval County School Board have the more persuasive argu-
ments. It bears reiterating that the school authorities in those cases did 
not decide to have prayers or in any way regulate or monitor the content 
of the prayers, all of which were delivered by students. The school 
authorities acquiesced in the student majority's desire for such prayers, 
reserved time in the graduation program schedule, and then left the 
students to their own devices. Accordingly, these cases more closely 
resemble Widmar v. VincenF1 and Board of Education of Westside 
Community Schools v. Mergens12-in which schools gave a place to meet 
to student religious groups without compromising First Amendment 
principles-than Lee v. Weisman, with its significant degree of control 
over the prayer by the school authorities. 
I have argued in two previous articles, and I continue to believe, that 
graduation school prayer can be constitutional under carefully controlled 
circumstances. 73 The fact patterns of the cases discussed embody such 
circumstances, with the possible exception of Gearon. However, the 
fault lines in the federal courts appear to be widening and other courts are 
probably destined to align themselves with either the Fifth Circuit or the 
Third and Ninth Circuits on this issue. It appears that the split in 
authority will soon make it appropriate if not necessary for the Supreme 
graduation does not take place during normal school hours." Harris, 41 F.3d at 454 n.5. 
Under such reasoning, any prayer or religious activity on school premises would be unconsti-
tutional, since presumably they would have to take place at times approved by school officials, 
and Mergens was wrongly decided. 
70. ld. at 460 (Wright, J., dissenting in part) (citations omitted). 
71. Widmarv. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holding that permitting a student religious 
group to meet on state university premises did not violate the Establishment Clause). 
72. Board of Educ. of Westside Community Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) 
(upholding the federal Equal Access Act, which protects the rights of student religious clubs, 
inter alia, to meet on public high school premises before or after class hours). 
73. See generally Schweitzer, supra note 3; Schweitzer, supra note 9. 
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Court to consider another graduation prayer case and resolve some of the 
questions the Court left unanswered in Lee v. Weisman. 
